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With the digitalization of society, the traditional crimes have manifested in digital opera-
tional environment in cybercrimes, which have created a need for organizations to build a 
lasting ability to detect and respond to the occurring security incidents. JAMK University of 
Applied Sciences in association with the Police University College have striven to find 
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objective of the research. The research was constructed using two different test cases 
which produced the results of how the tools’ performance. The results verified that the re-
searched tools are capable of gathering data from occurred incident on organizational en-
vironment, and usage of the tools in the assignor’s technical environment execution is jus-
tifiable. However, the tools require additional expertise when performing intensive investi-
gation as they have similar features. All things considered, the researched tools should still 
be considered as a combination of two tools and when selected to investigate an organiza-
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Keywords/tags (subjects)  
Cyber security, cybercrime, live response, incident response, digital forensics 
 
 
Miscellaneous (Confidential information)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kuvailulehti 
Tekijä(t)  
Ahonen, Joni 
Julkaisun laji 
Opinnäytetyö, AMK 
Päivämäärä 
Helmikuu 2020 
Julkaisun kieli 
Englanti 
Sivumäärä 
75 
Verkkojulkaisulupa myön-
netty: Kyllä 
Työn nimi 
Performing remote live response on organizational environment 
Tutkinto-ohjelma 
Tieto- ja viestintätekniikka 
Työn ohjaaja(t)  
Juha Saarisilta 
Sampo Kotikoski 
Toimeksiantaja(t)  
JAMK Jyväskylän ammattikorkeakoulu; JYVSECTEC; CYBERDI-projekti; Marko Vatanen 
Tiivistelmä 
Yhteiskunnan digitalisoituminen on aiheuttanut rikollisuuden siirtymistä digitaaliseen 
toimintaympäristöön. Tietoverkoissa tapahtuvat rikokset ovat luoneet organisaatioille 
tarpeen kehittää organisaatiokohtaista kyvykkyyttä kyberhyökkäyksien tunnistamiseen, 
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ritty jo hankkeen aikana vastaamaan JYVSECTECin, työn tilaajan, julkaisemalla konseptita-
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Glossary 
 
.dockerignore Special file of Docker which Docker Engine utilizes to 
exclude sensitive and unnecessary files and folders from 
build context of image.  
Apache License 2.0 Open source license by Apache, version 2.0.  
Cobalt Strike Beacon Feature of Cobalt Strike penetration testing tool 
developed by Raphael Mudge which allows modelling 
threat actors actions using common protocols such HTTP, 
HTTPS or DNS via payload.  
Docker image Production of Dockerfile which is used as a base when a 
running instance of image, Docker container, is created.  
Docker Swarm Clustering tool of Docker used for deploying and scaling 
services on multiple Docker hosts.  
Docker Refers to Docker Engine. Enables the creation, managing 
and running of containerized applications on any major 
operating system without dependency issues.  
Dockerfile Special text file, a receipt, which the Docker utilizes when 
the image is built.  
Git Version Controlling System (VCS) enabling paraller 
changes to the project to be made and versioning and 
storing the data as a stream of snapshots.  
Hybrid cryptosystem Involves use of more than one cryptographical method for 
data encryption, where the public-key cryptosystem is 
used for key encapsulation and symmetric-key 
cryptosystem for data encapsulation.  
Kubernetes Orchestration tool for containerized applications.  
KYHA19tv Cyber security exercise planned, organized, and executed 
by JYVSECTEC for Finland’s national defensive agencies 
held in fall 2019.  
MySQL Oracle Corporation’s developt database management 
system which utilizes relational database tables.  
Nginx Server software designed to versatile use such as HTTP 
web server serving with reverse proxying and load 
balancing, initially written by Igor Sysoev.  
PHR model Conceptual Prepare – Hunt – Respond model designed by 
JYVSECTEC’s specialists to help organizations improve 
their ability to prepare, detect, and response to the 
incidents.  
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PowerShell Powerful command-line shell designed for automated use 
of systems and advanced system administration tasks 
invented by Jeffrey Snover, initially targeted for Windows 
operating systems but latter open sourced and cross-
platformed.  
REL_DB Database format which replaced the use of older AFF4 
database format in GRR from version 3.3.0.0 onwards.  
SQLite Widely used and efficient SQL database engine written in 
C programming language with long term support of 
developers.  
Terraform Tool for descriping infrastructure as a code. Enables the 
manageable way to build, change, and version 
infrastructure.  
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Motivation 
The digitalisation of society has placed citizens and organizations to face a new mani-
festation of crime, called cybercrime, in their everyday life. In today’s world, a single 
individual can confront harassment, fraud, abuse, or even get killed by cybercrime 
committed utilizing digital operational environment. When a cyber-attack is targeted 
at organization’s information systems and networks, it can be vital for continuance of 
the operation if the critical assets are accessed and revealed by the attacker. (Sihto 
2019; Tietoverkkorikollisuuden torjuntaa koskeva selvitys 2017.)  
At the same time when the amount of criminal activity has increased in information 
networks, the amount of reports of an offence made to the Police of Finland has 
been trailed. The reasons for this can be seen to vary. Single individuals can feel 
shame about what have happened, and an organization can face image-related prob-
lems. On the other hand, a single individual does not necessarily know how to act in 
this kind of situation, organizations may not have corresponsive processes, or lack 
knowledge, insufficient observation ability and resource targeting during and after 
when the security incident occur. (Anttila 2018; Valkama 2019.)  
The objective of this thesis, assigned by JYVSECTEC (Jyväskylä Security Technology) is 
to examine and test the capability and performance requirements of two preselected 
open source tools, GRR Rapid Response and osquery, designed for performing re-
mote live response. The objective is reached using two different test cases that 
measure both the tool’s ability to gather data from endpoints to identify and contain 
assumed information security incident from the organizational Information Technol-
ogy (IT) environment simulating a real-world organizational environment, and perfor-
mance requirements that the tool sets for the underlying hardware when used for 
active investigation on organizational environment that includes hundreds of end-
points.  
The cyber-attacks used in test cases are based on Techniques, Tactics, and Proce-
dures (TTPs) that Active Persistent Threat (APT) actors have executed on their cam-
paigns in the past years. Promising results lead the implementation of the tools as a 
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part of a larger cybercrime prevention environment that will be designed and built 
during the CYBERDI project’s cybercrime prevention working package in association 
with Police University College, the Finnish police education facility.  
1.2 JYVSECTEC – Jyväskylä Security Technology 
According to the JYVSECTEC’s official website (JYVSECTEC overview n.d) JYVSECTEC is 
an independent cyber security research, development, and training center located in 
Jyväskylä, Central Finland. JYVSECTEC is a part of the Institute of Information Tech-
nology at JAMK University of Applied Sciences, and nationally it is one of the leading 
operators in the domain of cyber security, as well as a globally noticed partner. 
JYVSECTEC operates Finland’s national Cyber Range and is the assignor of this thesis. 
(Finnish cyber security expertise in Singapore – JAMK University of Applied Sciences 
and Singapore Polytechnic collaborating in Centre of Excellence in Applied Cyber Se-
curity 2019; JYVSECTEC organization 2019; JYVSECTEC overview n.d.) 
One of JYVSECTEC’s objectives is to offer high-quality cyber security exercises for 
Finnish national government’s defensive agencies and organizations operating under 
public and private sector. Along with planning, providing, and executing the exer-
cises, JYVSECTEC participates in numerous research and development (R&D) projects 
as a part of the Institute of Information Technology at JAMK University of Applied Sci-
ences, executes system and software testing, consulting, offering also lightweight 
certification programs. (JYVSECTEC services n.d.)  
The cyber security exercises organized by JYVSECTEC utilize the unique Realistic 
Global Cyber Environment (RGCE). RGCE simulates the real-world Internet, its core 
functionalities, and services as accurately as possible. For instance, RGCE consists of 
implementation of following protocols and systems:  
• Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) routed network 
• a real-world public Internet Protocol (IP) addressing 
• hierarchically implemented Domain Name System (DNS) 
• Global Time System (GTS) 
• Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). (JYVSECTEC Cyber Range – RGCE and solutions n.d, 2–
3.)  
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To create a more realistic environment, use of different public services such as social 
media platforms Twitter and Facebook, application store, news media and instant 
messengers are resolved in RGCE. In addition, RGCE includes numerous organiza-
tional environments from the field of business and industry as well as Internet Ser-
vice Provider (ISP) and cloud providers, each of them with unique sectoral and corpo-
rative features. In this research, two of the RGCE’s organizational environments were 
used to simulate a real-world organizational environment in test cases. (JYVSECTEC 
Cyber Range – RGCE and solutions n.d, 3–11.)  
One of the biggest advantages of RGCE is that it is fully isolated from the production 
network, i.e. RGCE’s Cyber Range can be thought of as a digital shooting range, 
where the organizations participating in the exercise have the possibility to practice 
offensive as well as defensive actions in real-world circumstances without insulting 
the existing laws or regulations. In Cyber Range, a large collection of different real-
world cyber threat attack vectors typical to a specific threat actor have been imple-
mented. There are also modelled single person actors such as script kiddies, small 
hacktivists and activists’ groupings with political or other agenda as well as several 
national APTs and organized criminal adversaries. Depending on the threat actors’ 
capability, it is possible to execute threat vectors such as variant Distributed Denial of 
Service (DDoS) attacks, ransomware and phishing campaigns, watering holes, mal-
ware variants originating from different malware families, as well as viruses, worms 
and Remote Access Trojans (RATs). (ibid., 2–4.)  
1.3 Project CYBERDI 
The name of CYBERDI project stands for the sentence “Cybercrime prevention, 
awareness raising and capacity building by RDI on modern cyber-attacks”. CYBERDI is 
an R&D project funded by the Ministry of Education and Culture of Finland and ad-
ministered by JAMK University of Applied Sciences with the association of Police Uni-
versity College, which is the Finnish police education facility. The total duration of the 
project is three years and it is executed in years 2018–2021. The project has been di-
vided into three different working packages: cybercrime prevention, awareness rais-
ing, and capacity building. (5 miljoonaa euroa ammattikorkeakoulujen soveltavaan 
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tutkimukseen ja innovaatioihin 2019; CYBERDI – Kansallista & kansainvälistä kyber-
osaamista kasvattamassa n.d; CYBERDI n.d.)  
In cybercrime prevention, the project executors’ intend to enhance their capability to 
prevent cybercrimes in modern digital environments. Prevention is built using the 
latest technologies such as Artificial Intelligence (AI), machine learning, and data ana-
lytics. Furthermore, new effective cooperation models are developed for cybercrime 
prevention and investigation to ease collaboration between different authorities. The 
research performed in this thesis is published as a part of the cybercrime prevention 
working package. (CYBERDI – Kansallista & kansainvälistä kyberosaamista 
kasvattamassa n.d.)  
In awareness raising the focus is to increase the target audience’s knowledge about 
the digital world around them and threat landscape that it brings. The target audi-
ence consist of organizations that operates in Finland’s public and private sector and 
healthcare organizations as well as students in upper secondary education and com-
prehensive school. (CYBERDI – Kansallista & kansainvälistä kyberosaamista 
kasvattamassa n.d.)  
In capacity building the cooperation with the partners from national and global net-
works is expanded to strengthen already existing partnerships and create new viable 
productive stakeholders across the globe, especially in the region of European Union 
(EU). The objective is to reinforce the already existing profiles of JAMK University of 
Applied Sciences and JYVSECTEC, when speaking of actors in the cyber security do-
main. (CYBERDI – Kansallista & kansainvälistä kyberosaamista kasvattamassa n.d.)  
 
2 Research design 
2.1 Research problem 
One of the CYBERDI project’s results has already been published by JYVSECTEC, 
namely the Prepare-Hunt-Respond conceptual model (PHR model). PHR model has 
been designed to ease the ability of organizations to absorb and understand how to 
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successfully detect, defend, and build efficient countermeasures against modern 
cyber-attacks. During the project, the model will be also developed to include a tech-
nical environment for the use of organizations consisting of a collection of tools, the 
source code of which has been published under open source license. (PHR model 
2019.)  
JYVSECTEC in the role of the assignor of the thesis has the problem that the tools 
need to be examined and tested extensively before they can be accepted and applied 
as a part of the PHR model’s technical execution. The scope for the tool survey is set 
to include investigation and documentation of the technical capabilities and limita-
tions as well as performance requirements of the tools so that it is possible to accom-
plish the applied execution. The absolute goal of the assignor is to find the best pos-
sible tools to tackle a specific field of the PHR model. The tools should also have inte-
gration possibilities and least possible overlap with other selected tools.  
One of the fields of the PHR model is Triage and Respond which involves an organiza-
tion’s use of digital forensic methods and incident response processes in a detailed 
investigation during the incidents (PHR model 2019). For the technical environment 
execution, the assignor had preselected two different existing tools, GRR Rapid Re-
sponse and osquery, which should cover both digital forensics and incident response 
actions, when the remote live response is performed. However, before the tools can 
be approved and applied as a part of the PHR model’s technical environment execu-
tion, the research problem needs to be set and answered first. Hence, the research 
problem for this thesis is defined using a set of research questions:  
• How well and reliably can the selected tool be used to identify and contain incidents 
from the selected organizational environment?  
• What are the performance requirements when the selected tool is used for investi-
gation performed in organizational environment that consists of hundreds of end-
points?  
2.2 Research method 
The research made in this thesis should be considered as an applied research, since it 
solves problems and find solutions in a practical manner. Furthermore, in research 
the specified tools are tested, and research is targeted for the assignor and its needs. 
In addition, the generated results should offer added value when practical execution 
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based on the research is made or further research executed. On the other hand, the 
research relies to the researcher’s empirical concrete observation and for this reason 
the research involves use of empirical research methods. (Baimyrazaeva 2018, 6; 
Hirsjärvi, Remes, & Sajavaara 2008, 128–129.)  
According to Baimyrzaeva (2018, 17–38) applied research should be considered as a 
process involving the research to be executed in five steps:  
1. Clarify your research focus 
2. Scan existing information 
3. Plan your research tasks and methods 
4. Collect, analyse, and interpret data 
5. Share your work.  
 
The base for the research work is constructed according to what is the objective of 
the research to be made (Baimyrzaeva 2018, 18). In this research, the objective is to 
find answers to the found research questions in a way that the produced results are 
reliable and can be used when applied execution or further research is considered. 
Therefore, the research questions dictate the base and direction for the research, 
and the construction of research methodology. The direction of the research is mod-
elled and focused during the research to provide more accurate results. However, 
the main objective of the research, answering the predefined research questions, re-
mains as the same.  
To get better perception of the researched field, the research is started by examina-
tion of the collection of scientific researches, papers, and resources as well as tools 
technical documentations published by the developers of the tools. The source criti-
cism is used when the reference material is gathered for the research. Based on the 
gathered material, a literature review is included to the research. The literature re-
view is the theoretical base of the research and includes a presentation of the exist-
ing theory in the scope of the research and provides overview to the technical opera-
tion of the researched tools.  
Research is continued by executing the initial tool deployment in local test environ-
ment to get early perception of the tools. The tools’ caveats and possible develop-
ment targets are discussed with the assignor. If any tool development targets are 
recognized they are to be solved before the research is continued.  
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Research objective is achieved by executing two different test cases that are con-
structed with an aim to produce accurate results for the research questions. In test 
case construction, the used testing environments in RGCE are taken into account and 
are resolved before any further construction work for the test cases is executed. 
There is discussion with JYVSECTEC’s specialists who are also consulted when the 
testing environment selections are made to improve the quality of test cases.  
After the testing environment selections, the tools are deployed in the environments 
on RGCE where the real-world organizational environment circumstances exist. A 
suitable construction for the tools in the testing environments is resolved in coopera-
tion with the assignor, since the used environments in RGCE are controlled by the as-
signor and involve the assignor’s administration, expertise, and consultation. This 
also applies to the tool deployment. Before and during the deployment process of 
the tools, the requirements and other expectations set by the assignor of the thesis 
are resolved and respected. This provides transparency between the parties during 
the tool deployment process.  
The first test case, capability testing, is constructed to answer the capability related 
research problem. To produce reliable and accurate results, the real-world APT level 
cyber-attack is generated on testing environment, a real-world organizational envi-
ronment. Use of realistic adversary techniques enables the investigation made using 
the tools to be executed in amidst of real-world security incident.  
In the second test case, performance requirement testing, the components of the 
GRR Rapid Response server are monitored using pre-existing advanced network 
monitoring solution. In this research the monitoring focuses on the server-side of the 
tool and the monitoring of GRR and osquery agent is excluded. The reason for this is 
twofold. First, when research is made only to the GRR’s server-side, it enables the re-
search to be more targeted. Targeting behalf provides more accurate results for the 
research question related to performance requirements. Secondly, the parties of the 
research are aware that there is already research made about the performance con-
straints and footprint of GRR’s agent, and the research is available for the use of the 
assignor (Moser & Cohen 2013). Furthermore, GRR agent resource usage can be con-
trolled on server-side in considerable manner. This also applies to the osquery agent, 
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since in this research the osquery agent is used and controlled by GRR Rapid Re-
sponse server and should remain within the same restrictions that are set for the 
GRR agent.  
As mentioned, the execution of test cases enables the objective of the research to be 
reached and provides results for the research questions. The criticisms and objective 
standpoint are used during the test cases and in presentation of the results to avoid 
any human errors. In other words, the presented results answer only the research 
questions and any ambiguousness is omitted. Based on results, it is possible to deter-
mine how well the research questions can be answered and deduce the success and 
reliability of the research and concern possibilities for further research.  
 
3 Digital forensics and incident response 
3.1 Incident response process 
As the name of the term suggests, incident response or in shorter IR is an organized 
and premeditated way to respond to security incidents occurring in organizational 
environments. The incident itself can be classified as any malicious activity that ex-
ceeds an organization's security policy. The objective of the incident response is to 
decrease the incident’s impact so that its severity can be reduced and the recovery 
process accelerated. (Luttgens, Pepe, & Mandia 2014.)  
Incident response is executed as a process called incident response process, which is 
carried out by an organization’s team, often designated for only this purpose. Inci-
dent response is a continuing variegated process and in every organization where the 
incident response process is implemented, the process takes into account the organi-
zation’s needs, resources, and procedures, meaning that the incident response pro-
cess is always organization-specific way to respond occurring security incidents. The 
incident response process is self-developing and every incident occurring in the or-
ganization’s environment should develop and improve it. (Luttgens et al. 2014.)  
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Regardless of how the incident response process methodology is applied to an organ-
ization, it is normally seen as a cycle of procedures involving actions from an incident 
response team assigned to the process as well as organization-wide actions. National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) (2012) suggests that the incident re-
sponse process should be executed as a four-step cycle process:  
• Preparation 
• Detection and analysis 
• Containment, eradication, and recovery 
• Post-incident activity.  
 
The detection and analysis phase involves that the organization has a general proce-
dure to detect and analyze the most common incidents occurring in organization’s 
environment, since the preparation for every possible incident bonds unnecessary 
resources and is not a lasting solution. When the organization has a described and 
organized procedure to recognize the typical attack vectors used by adversaries and 
detect the common IoCs (Indicator of Compromise) from the organizational environ-
ment, the possible occurring or an already occurred incident can be detected earlier, 
and the investigation started and recovery from incident is accelerated. (NIST – Na-
tional Institute of Standards and Technology 2012.)  
3.2 Digital and computer forensics 
The term forensics originates from Latin and according to Merriam-Webster diction-
ary (n.d), the definition for the word is “application of scientific knowledge to legal 
problems”. Forensics, in a term as it stands, does not take into account what the sci-
entific knowledge brought to courts of judicature is or what is the field of forensics or 
the methods that has been used. When forensic science involves evidence collection 
from digital devices or more specifically from computers, the terms digital forensics 
and computer forensics are used. (Graves 2013; Reith, Carr, & Gunsch 2002.) 
Digital forensics intend to find traces about criminal activity in a digital operational 
environment such as digital devices and networks so that the emphasized knowledge 
of what was happened can be proved and used as evidence in court. Digital devices 
can be classified to include all those physical computing devices that use electronic 
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signals. Beyond these devices, everyday devices such as laundry dryers, which are 
traditionally not seen as digital devices, are now becoming digitalized by the Internet 
of Things (IoT). Appending IoT devices to the list of digital devices expands the list of 
potential devices for digital forensics drastically. (Bourgeois 2019; Marcella & 
Menendez 2008; Reith et al. 2002.)  
Speaking of computer forensics, the investigation is targeted at computers; however, 
the means are the same as in digital forensics: to find evidence from malicious ac-
tions that are accepted in court (Reith et al. 2002). When crime scene investigation is 
started by first responders the National Institute of Justice (2008) suggests that the 
following digital devices should be considered as potential evidence:  
• Computer systems 
• Storage devices 
• Handheld devices 
• Peripheral devices 
• Computer networks 
• Other potential sources of digital evidence.  
 
As incident response, digital forensics is executed as a predefined process. According 
to Johansen (2017) digital forensics process involves investigator to execute investi-
gation in six steps: identification, preservation, collection, examination, analysis and 
presentation. Johansen also informs that the digital forensics process is an important 
part of incident response process; when applied, digital forensics process is a compo-
nent of investigation workflow which should deliver knowledge about what has hap-
pened and bring evidence to the investigation that can be used connecting the party 
behind the incident to the incident. (Johansen 2017.)  
3.3 Data acquisition 
As mentioned, during computer forensics process the investigator intend to find evi-
dence from computer devices. The process driven by an investigator usually involves 
taking a duplication from the target device such as hard drive or memory. Imaging al-
lows the investigator to accomplish forensic investigation to the duplicated target 
without affecting the device’s original state. However, improvements that the digital 
devices have faced have brought new methods of how the investigation is executed, 
19 
 
 
since imaging is a time consuming process and when the number of investigated sys-
tems grows, the forensic process involves more and more time. (Luttgens et al. 
2014.)  
Live response, or in shorter LR, refer to the real-time data collection for the use of in-
vestigation process. The gathered data vary; however, the means is the same; with 
live response an investigator intend to gather volatile data from a target system that 
can otherwise be lost. Live response also answers to the challenges that the tradi-
tional forensics produces to the investigation by forensic duplication, since live re-
sponse intend to gather data in real-time, answering the investigation related ques-
tions more rapidly and without delaying the continuance of investigation process. 
(Luttgens et al. 2014.)  
According to Luttgens, Pepe, and Mandia (2014), performing live response can be 
considerable when following observations in investigation are recognized:  
• Volatile data consists of data that can not be investigated using other methods 
• The change to the target system is controllable and as minimal as possible 
• The number of contaminated systems is large 
• The performed imaging preserve time and possibility for failing exists 
• Legal or other considerations require as much data as possible.  
 
However, the live response should be considered harmful if the process of acquisi-
tion of volatility data is not well automated and described, and the impact of the 
tools is unknown. Live response tools used for data gathering inevitably change the 
target system’s state and without precise knowledge about the used tool’s impact to 
the target system, live response can paralyse, mislead or damage the investigation 
process. For instance, Walters and Petroni inform (2007) that specific tools used in 
live response research have changed the system state significantly: how drastic 
change to the system was, Walters and Petroni notices that the impact is bigger than 
letting the system run 15 hours incessantly. In some cases, live response might also 
be the ringing bell for the attacker in system to go undercover. (Luttgens et al. 2014; 
Walters & Petroni 2007.)  
Brezinski and Killalea (2002) inform in Request for Comments (RFC) 3227 that the 
data should be gathered in the order of its volatility. According to Brezinski and 
Killalea, the data collection should be started from registers and cache and continued 
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with network related data such routing tables and Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) 
tables. In addition, the processes and temporal file systems are to be gathered be-
fore the hard disk, logging and monitoring data is acquired. The least volatile data to 
gather is the systems physical configuration and archive medias. However, the 
knowledge of what to acquire and in what order is not enough; also the individual 
features of a target system such as the running operating system (OS) are needed to 
take into account when data is gathered. (Brezinski & Killalea 2002; Lutggens et al. 
2014.)  
Live response is executed locally at the same physical location where the target sys-
tem or systems reside. However, when the number of investigated systems increases 
and the physical location varies, performing live response becomes challenging. How-
ever, remotely performed live response can be used for data acquisition over the 
networks. Remote live response intends to gather the same volatile data from the 
target system as live response; however, the investigation can be performed using 
network connections whether or not the investigator has physical access to the sys-
tem. (Johansen 2017.)  
 
4 Technical review 
4.1 Osquery 
4.1.1 Operational overview 
Osquery is an open source agent-based tool designed for endpoint instrumentation. 
Osquery is written in C++ programming language and it is designed and maintained 
by Facebook. Along with Facebook, also other contributors have participated in the 
development work of the tool. Osquery was introduced and published to the crowd 
in June 2014 when the Facebook made the first announcement of the tool that has 
capability to model and describe the OS in which the tool is deployed as a relational 
database by making the initial commit to the osquery’s Git project repository. By 
constructing the Structured Query Language (SQL) based queries, osquery can be 
used to retrieve information about abstract concepts such as established network 
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connections from the underlying OS in an efficient manner. (Chacon & Straub 2014; 
Osquery documentation n.d; Osquery n.d; Sereyvathana & Reed n.d.) 
Osquery consists of two separate instances of which the osquery’s interactive shell, 
osqueryi can be used to retrieve information about the current OS and its changes. 
The use of osqueryi comes in handy when a new constructed query needs to be eval-
uated without affecting the existing configurations, since it does not involve the use 
of daemon in its working and can be considered as a standalone version of the tool. 
The daemon instance of the tool, osqueryd, gathers information from the endpoints, 
and it can be queried, logged, scheduled and monitored by changes in a more effi-
cient and scalable manner. The current version of the tool (version 4.0.2, released on 
13 September 2019) includes in total 232 different tables that can be used to retrieve 
a large scale of distinct information about the target system, and it changes by con-
structing and executing the queries. (Osquery documentation n.d; Schema n.d; Os-
query n.d.) 
Osquery has been designed to run on every major OS used in enterprises such as 
Windows, Linux, MacOS, and FreeBSD. Regardless of what the underlying OS is, the 
same query, utilizing for instance the table that can be used to retrieve the currently 
logged in users, made on every supported OS should retrieve the report with the 
same structure. What is worth of noticing is that the current version consists of 40 
tables that can be used regardless of what is the underlying OS. The major part of the 
tables has OS related features and tables are not supported other than in one OS; 
however, the way how the queries are constructed remains the same. (Osquery doc-
umentation n.d; Performant endpoint visibility n.d.) 
4.1.2 Query structure and management 
The construction of a correct query structure involves using osquery’s implementa-
tion, a subset of SQLite. Osquery’s query construction starts from using the tradi-
tional SQLite statements. However, in osquery the only statement with direct effect 
on queries is the SELECT statement. After SELECT statement, the construction is con-
tinued by selecting the desired rows, records from tables, which are selected using 
FROM clause after the record specification. The specification for retrieved data is 
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performed using clauses such as WHERE. In addition, it is possible to perform the 
normal use of SQLite wildcards. (About SQLite n.d; Osquery documentation n.d.) 
Osquery enables the joining of distinct tables. For instance, if it is desired to acquire 
those processes executed by a specific user, osquery tables processes and users can 
be joined in query to retrieve the desired result as concatenation of two tables. For 
construction of queries osquery provides a detailed schema documentation, which is 
useful when monitoring is performed efficiently and in a more intensive manner. (Os-
query documentation n.d; Schema n.d.) 
As mentioned, the execution of single queries is viable when queries are evaluated, 
and interactive instance of the tool used. When performing more sustained and ro-
bust monitoring, for instance in organization environment, the management of que-
ries can easily become challenging since the number and interval of queries raises in-
exorably. However, the daemon instance of tool, osqueryd, allows packing distinct 
queries by default in filesystem plugin, a specific configuration file, which enables 
growing the number of used queries without losing the tool’s controllability. In addi-
tion, the scheduling and logging related configuration is added to the configuration 
file. (Osquery documentation n.d.) 
4.1.3 Deployment considerations 
Deployment of a single instance of osquery agent is a straightforward process. The 
project offers distinct installation packages and executables for every supported OS. 
Alternatively, compiling the tool directly from the source code is possible and is the 
developer recommended way for the tool deployment. (Osquery documentation 
n.d.) 
Osquery agent is installed and deployed on every endpoint that is desired to be mon-
itored. In small deployments controlling agents can be managed via a remote con-
nection such SSH (Secure Shell). However, when the number of monitored endpoints 
rises, the manual management of agents becomes more difficult. When the system 
monitoring is about to be executed in a large scale, for instance on an organizational 
environment, the use of alternative solutions is required. As the osquery’s official 
documentation (n.d) informs, osquery does not offer by default any centralized fleet 
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manager for the agents. However, few third-party solutions exist and are available 
for the fleet management, the implementation, suitability, and use of which is left on 
deployer’s own consideration. (Osquery documentation n.d.)  
Managing every endpoint in an organization without centralized access to the system 
to be monitored is not a lasting and viable solution when speaking of remote live re-
sponse. One solution for controlling osquery agents in endpoints for the use of re-
mote live response is to use GRR Rapid Response, which allows gathering data and 
composing results from the osquery agents on endpoints in a centralized way with-
out changing the tool’s default usage, constructing queries. (Osquery documentation 
n.d.)  
4.2 GRR Rapid Response 
4.2.1 Operational overview 
GRR Rapid Response, later GRR, is an open source incident response framework writ-
ten in Python 2.7 programming language. The development work of GRR was started 
in 2011 by Google with an aim to create a state-of-the-art tool that meets the re-
quirements set for a cross-platform and scalable incident response framework focus-
ing on remote live response. Google has committed a long-term support for the GRR 
and since 2011 it has been continuously developed and maintained by Google's full-
day software engineers and other contributors, currently being at version 3.3.0.8 (re-
leased on 9 October 2019). (GRR Rapid Response n.d; GRR Rapid Response documen-
tation n.d.)  
According to GRR’s official documentation (n.d), the main features of GRR are (only 
features viable for the research are listed):  
• Written in Python 2.7 programming language (Python 3.6 written version was re-
leased in the end of the year 2019) 
• Consists of two main parts: server and agent 
• Allows a powerful investigation to be made remotely to the organization environ-
ment over the network 
• A cross-platform agent that supports the most common operating systems (Win-
dows, Linux, MacOS) 
• A fully functional API (Application Programming Interface) that can be used to man-
age the incident responders' everyday tasks across the fleet of agents 
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• The scalability of GRR has been tested on around 50 k client machine environment 
by Google and in smaller deployments made by other organizations 
• Due to open source code, GRR can be implemented and modelled into a different 
environment with different requirements. (GRR Rapid Response documentation n.d.)  
 
GRR server and agent utilize the traditional client-server model in bilateral communi-
cation. GRR server is a centralized server used to launch forensic tasks on the clients 
over the network. Respectively, GRR agents are installed on those endpoints, or in 
other words, on clients desired to be examined. GRR utilizes the unique messages for 
the communication between server and clients, and all message exchange is en-
crypted. Figure 1 explains GRR's operation mode from the start of a single request-
response investigation workflow to the view of results: (Cohen, Bilby, & Caronni 
2011; GRR Rapid Response documentation n.d.)  
1. Investigator starts a new desired investigation workflow on a GRR server for a de-
sired client or fleet of clients on investigation domain where the GRR agent is suc-
cessfully installed 
2. GRR server serializes, encrypts and signs required workflow and appends it to the cli-
ent specific message queue  
3. GRR agent installed on the client polls the GRR server for assigned message queue 
periodically for addressed workflows  
4. When the addressed workflow is successfully added to the queue, the GRR agent will 
then request the message from the server to the client in the next time period using 
a signed HTTP (Hypertext Transfer Protocol) GET request  
5. The GRR agent will then decrypt the signed workflow and start the requested investi-
gation workflow on the client  
6. After the task is executed, GRR agent will then encrypt the results to a message and 
send them as a reply to the GRR server with an appropriate signed HTTP POST re-
quest  
7. GRR server decrypts the serialized message and informs investigator for the results.  
 
 
Figure 1. GRR operation mode illustrated (adapted from Cohen et al. 2011)  
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4.2.2 GRR server and agent 
The operation of GRR server has been divided between four distinct logical compo-
nents: HTTP front-end, worker, user interface consisting of web-based Graphical User 
Interface (GUI) and API endpoint, and datastore. Every component has their own 
special purpose; front-end handles the HTTP based communication between GRR 
server and agent, worker is used for flow processing, user interface to the adminis-
trative purposes and investigation creation, launch, management, and automation, 
and datastore to store the collected results and messages generated during the com-
ponent communications. (Cohen et al. 2011; GRR Rapid Response documentation 
n.d.)  
Since the scalability is one of the main features of GRR, the server components are 
designed to be executable as separate processes and multiple instances to meet the 
requirements set by the environment where the tool is used for and the intensity of 
incident’s responders team actions. By the nature of components, the load between 
distinct components varies. To avoid a possible bottleneck emergence on those com-
ponents that fall under heavy load, the reasonable resource targeting and scaling 
should be considered when components are deployed. Accordingly, those compo-
nents that fall under light load are not so critical when speaking of bottlenecks, and 
scaling of which can be considered in situations when redundancy is desired. (GRR 
Rapid Response documentation n.d.) 
For instance, if an organization’s incident response team is going to use GRR inten-
sively and investigation domain consists of thousands of clients, it is advisable to con-
sider running distinct HTTP front-end and worker processes as multiple instances and 
deploying reasonable datastore, which should scale linearly. Accordingly, even if GRR 
is deployed for the use of an active incident response team, there is no necessary 
need to run multiple user interface instances as the component is under light load; 
however, this might be considerable and reasonable if redundancy is needed and in-
vestigation team consist of multiple concurrent users. Using reasonable resource tar-
geting, every component can be correctly dimensioned and built to meet investiga-
tion and environmentally implemented needs. (GRR Rapid Response documentation 
n.d.)  
26 
 
 
As mentioned, the GRR server uses a centralized database to store formalized data. 
From the version 3.2.4.5 (released on 17 December 2018) onwards the support for 
MySQL database management system was released, and the support for its prede-
cessor SQLite was deprecated. However, as the developer team announces on GRR’s 
official documentation (n.d), due to the version updates the use of distinct backend 
system is also possible such as Google’s Bigtable datastore. Furthermore, from the 
version 3.3.0.0 (released on 22 May 2019) onwards the old, default Advanced Foren-
sic Format 4 (AFF4) data storing technology has been replaced with REL_DB data for-
mat to bring stability and performance improvements. Even if the REL_DB is not 
backward compatible with AFF4, the AFF4 can still be used instead of REL_DB if de-
sired; however, this is discouraged by developers for beforementioned reasons. 
(Cruz, Moser, & Cohen 2015; GRR Rapid Response documentation n.d; Moser & Co-
hen 2013; What is MySQL? n.d.)  
GRR agent is a Python 2.7 written piece of program supporting common enterprise 
used operating systems: Windows, Linux and MacOS. After the first deployment of 
the GRR server adding a new client to GRR’s investigation domain is a simple and 
straightforward process. If configured, the GRR server produces the GRR agent instal-
lation binary with the corresponding conﬁgurations and populates the desired loca-
tion with generated installation packages. If changes to the GRR server configuration 
are made, repacking of the installation packages can be made and updates on clients 
perform. (GRR Rapid Response documentation n.d.)  
Updates on agents can be delivered using the specific administrative flow designed 
for replacing the obsoleted agent with updated or performing agent reinstallation 
manually. In addition, when the forensic task is created, the GRR agents’ resource us-
age on clients can be managed using flow or hunt specific trace holds. (GRR Rapid Re-
sponse documentation n.d.)  
4.2.3 Client-Server communication 
GRR agent and server communication are based on top of HTTP protocol, and all 
transmitted data between GRR server and agent are serialized. GRR utilizes Google’s 
protocol buffer (protobuf) data serialization mechanism for a data serialization. Pro-
tobuf allows serialization of data regardless of the used programming language or 
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platform. In fact, the messages exchanged between GRR agent and server are a pro-
tobuf encoded description of the flow execution containing fields such as session 
identifier, name and arguments as well as request and response identifier. (Devel-
oper Guide n.d; GRR Rapid Response documentation n.d.)  
As mentioned, GRR encrypts all message exchange between client and server. Ac-
cording to the GRR Rapid Response’s source code (2019), encryption is performed us-
ing a hybrid cryptosystem constructed from a key encapsulation scheme and data en-
capsulation scheme. The source code (n.d) indicates that GRR uses symmetric-key ci-
pher algorithm AES (Advanced Encryption System) in CBC (Cipher Block Chaining) 
mode with 128-bit key length and IV (Initial Vector) as key encapsulation scheme. 
The RSA (Rivest-Shamir-Adleman) keys are used as a data encapsulation scheme to 
bring protection against symmetric key delivery problems. (Cramer & Shoup 2003; 
GRR Rapid Response n.d.)  
As the developer of the GRR, Ogaro (2019a) informs, following phases describe how 
hybrid cryptosystem is implemented on message exchange between server and 
agent when the GRR server requests a forensic task to be performed on a client:  
1. Both GRR server and agent have their own RSA, by default a 2048-bit, public-private 
key pair used for signing and encrypting, public keys are exchanged 
2. Server generates a new random AES 256-bit session key 
3. Server encrypts protobuf message which holds the forensic task using the AES key 
4. Server encrypts the AES key and signs the message using client’s RSA public key 
5. Agent fetches the encrypted message and key from the server’s message queue 
6. Agent decrypts the AES key and veriﬁes the signed message using the client’s RSA 
private key 
7. Agent decrypts the message using the decrypted AES key 
8. Agent starts the request forensic task on the client and replies to the server with ap-
propriate encrypted message. (Ogaro 2019a.)  
 
The message exchange is started when GRR server requests the GRR agent on client 
to perform a task such as forensic data acquisition. The composed message is la-
belled with request identifier as illustrated in Figure 2, which is incremented be-
tween distinct flows. After the message has been composed, server sets the message 
to the client’s message queue. When the agent on client has fetched the message 
from the assigned message queue and resolved the requested task, the agent then 
constructs and delivers the response message to the server server using HTTP POST 
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request. Before transmission to the server, the client composes and labels the mes-
sage with corresponsive request identifier and response identifier. (Cohen et al. 
2011; GRR Rapid Response documentation n.d.)  
 
 
Figure 2. Message exchange illustrated (adapted from Cohen et al. 2011)  
 
If the required task needs multiple client responses, the agent increases the response 
identifier by one between responses. In such scenarios, GRR server waits the special 
final response, a status message, which informs the server that the requested task is 
terminated successfully or with errors. If termination ends with error, the correspon-
sive traceback is included into the message. Otherwise, the corresponsive results are 
shown to the user and the message exchange has succeeded. (Cohen et al. 2011; 
GRR Rapid Response documentation n.d.)  
4.2.4 GRR concepts 
Flow is a logical task that can be used to perform a forensic or administrative opera-
tion on a desired client agent. For example, task specific ﬂow can be used when an 
incident responder wants to start a new investigation from ﬁnding out if a speciﬁc 
ﬁle has been seen on a speciﬁc client on the environment by listing the target file sys-
tem. The organizational networks can easily consist of a thousand of clients and 
launching this kind of search on every client machine would bond unnecessary re-
sources and time if only targeted investigation is desired. As in the beforementioned 
case, the incident investigation is often started from a certain point of organization 
environment and then extended to consider the larger fleet of clients to find out the 
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spread of an incident. In fact, flows can be copied to hunt to make the same research 
on every or specific subset of clients on investigation domain. (Cohen et al. 2011; 
GRR Rapid Response documentation n.d.)  
Conﬁguration and ﬂow management is handled via a web-based GUI or utilizing the 
API endpoint via CLI (Command Line Interface). GRR includes a large collection of 
preinstalled ﬂows for the most common forensic tasks. Executing a flow produces re-
sults that the investigator can examine directly from the GUI or CLI or exporting them 
to an archived file using common file formats such CSV (Comma Separated Values). 
Additionally, investigators can write and import their own Python scripts which can 
be used via a ﬂow on GRR that is designed for this purpose. (GRR Rapid Response 
documentation n.d.)  
To avoid the excessive tying of recourses, the developers of GRR have designed ﬂow 
to be an asynchronous task, a state machine. In client-server model this means that 
the resources are freed from the ﬂow execution on the server-side when the ﬂow is 
launched on a desired client agent. This enables server resources to be used else-
where before the client responses and ﬂow execution is continued. (GRR Rapid Re-
sponse documentation n.d.)  
Simply put: hunt is an extended ﬂow. As mentioned, every terminated ﬂow can be 
copied to a hunt to start the same investigation using the same parameters, for in-
stance on every client or a subset of clients in the environment. If the beforemen-
tioned scenario leads to IoC which it is defined to be originated from malicious ac-
tion, the incident responders’ next step in investigation process would be to define 
all those client machines in the organization’s environment where the IoC has been 
seen and perform a suitable analysis for the acquired artefact. Using hunt, exploring 
contaminated clients from the environment is efficient and should reduce the time 
what is taken to conducting contaminated machines from the environment and ac-
celerates the start of further investigation. (GRR Rapid Response documentation 
n.d.)  
As mentioned, hunt can be useful in cases when clarifying the spread of a certain in-
cident needs to be made. Furthermore, GRR’s implementation of scheduled jobs al-
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lows the use of scheduled hunts. If the investigator wants to perform proactive hunt-
ing in an organization’s environment, every hunt can be configured to perform a cer-
tain activity on desired clients as scheduled in specific periods of time range. (GRR 
Rapid Response documentation n.d.)  
4.2.5 Security considerations 
When speaking of security, the GRR’s official documentation (n.d) informs that the 
GRR should be taken as a tool that has security considerations needed to be recog-
nized and resolved before the tool is deployed for production use. By default, with-
out any security consideration, the GRR enables possibilities for harmful actions. 
(GRR Rapid Response documentation n.d.)  
The GRR server can be connected, and a new client added to the investigation do-
main by using any server generated GRR agent and correct server address. This 
means that if the adversary gets its hands on the GRR agent installer, it can use the 
adversary-controlled agent to inspect what the forensic tasks are that are performed 
by a trusted investigator on investigation domain when an environment-wide hunt is 
performed. Using this knowledge, the adversary can gather information about the in-
vestigated client systems of the organization environment and from the investigation 
methods. (GRR Rapid Response documentation n.d.)  
Investigation information can be useful for the adversary in scenarios, for instance, 
when the adversary already has access to the target environment and intends to stay 
under of investigation radar or monitor if the means of the adversary are already re-
solved by the investigator. What is more, if the adversary has privileged access to the 
organization environment and clients, the execution of agents can be stopped or dis-
abled. In some scenarios, adversary-controlled agent can be used to send arbitrary 
messages such as error messages to the server, and if succeeded, raise the possibility 
of a potential DoS (Denial of Service) attack, the exhaustion of resources on the 
server so that the server's normal operation aborts. (GRR Rapid Response documen-
tation n.d.)  
Other consideration when speaking of security is to resolve how the authentication is 
handled in GRR when GUI or API endpoint is reached over the network. By default, 
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GRR’s administrative GUI can be reached using HTTP protocol and server’s IP address 
and desired web browser, and the API endpoint with developer provided Python li-
brary. However, the used HTTP protocol does not provide any encryption for the 
transmitted data, and all information such as login information is delivered as a 
plaintext. Adversary using this knowledge can sit between the client and server, 
called man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack and inspect network traffic for the legitim 
credentials from the transmitted data, which then can be used to successful login on 
the GRR’s investigation domain. Along with the implementation of secure protocols 
for the use of authentication, what also should be considered are the correct con-
straints to and from where the GUI and API endpoint can be connected. (GRR Rapid 
Response documentation n.d.)  
 
5 Deployment work 
5.1 Starting point 
The deployment work of the researched tools, GRR Rapid Response and osquery, was 
executed first to receive an initial and general perception about the installation pro-
cess and use of the tools in practice. Furthermore, the assignor introduced a list of 
requirements needed to be resolved before the tools were deployed on the RGCE’s 
organizational environments and implemented to the test cases:  
• The deployment process of GRR server should be simple and straightforward, and it 
should be handled using Docker images (Docker Glossary n.d) 
• The containerized GRR should use the latest version of the official GRR image 
• The usage of a containerized GRR should also be possible in offline environments 
• The containerized GRR should offer good scalability and added security.  
 
The list of requirements focused only on the server-side of GRR since it was observed 
that the deployment of GRR and osquery agents is a straightforward process. In addi-
tion, the agents do not have or produce any restrictions that should have been re-
solved when implemented on RGCE’s organizational environments.  
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GRR project offers an official Docker image which can be used to deploy the GRR 
server’s logical components’ HTTP front-end, worker and user interface within a sin-
gle Docker container. The official image includes also a bundled MySQL database for 
data storing. However, as the developer team has been noticed on GRR’s official doc-
umentation (n.d), the use of the official image is ideal only when the tool is deployed 
for testing or evaluation purposes. According to the developer of GRR, Ogaro (Ogaro 
2019b), this originates from the fact that the component bundling in one container 
removes the scalability of a single component.  
It is worth noticing that GRR server can already be deployed and scaled when the 
server is compiled directly from a source code or installed from software packages. 
These installation methods allow the deployment and execution of logical compo-
nent instances multiple times and on demand in distinct physical servers. However, 
from the perspective of the research, the beforementioned options were excluded, 
since the requirements for the tool development set by assignor demanded the use 
of Docker images. (GRR Rapid Response n.d.) 
Initially, the idea was to divide the official image in a way that each logical compo-
nent of the GRR server can be executed in their own Docker container. The predic-
tion was that if the division of components success, it should offer a better scalability 
than the official image allowing usage of the containerized GRR also in large organi-
zational networks and the ability to perform investigation more intensively when an 
orchestration solution such as Docker Swarm or Kubernetes is used for scaling. 
(Docker Glossary n.d; Production-Grade Container Orchestration – Automated con-
tainer deployment, scaling, and management n.d.)  
5.2 Research of publicly available resources 
To get the best result for the GRR official image division, publicly available resources 
were searched to examine how other developers have deployed GRR in their envi-
ronments. During the research process Spotify free and open source software (FOSS) 
team's blog post was researched. Spotify’s FOSS team announced on their engineer-
ing and technology blog post how the team has built a Terraform module for a GRR 
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server and implemented it in a Google Compute Engine (GCE) successfully. (Introduc-
tion to Terraform n.d; Whacking a Million Moles – Automated Incident Response In-
frastructure in GCP 2019.)  
Spotify's Git project repository (2019) on their behalf revealed that the team has also 
built a working testing environment successfully containing Dockerfiles for HTTP 
front-end, worker, and user interface components of GRR server. In addition, the 
Dockerfiles use the official GRR image as a base image (Docker Glossary n.d).  
Although the work Spotify’s FOSS team have performed seemed promising for a di-
rect deployment, there were features that did not meet the requirements set by the 
assignor. For instance, Spotify's version used quite an old version of GRR image as a 
base image (version 3.2.4.7) so there was need for an update. Another disparity was 
that Spotify's version takes advantage of GCE, which did not meet the requirement 
for an offline tool. For this reason, it was decided to use Spotify's version as a review 
base and build a unique containerized GRR on top of the developing work that 
Spotify’s developer team has made. (Spotify 2019.)  
5.3 Division of official GRR Docker image 
The division work of official GRR Docker image was started by making the code base 
review to the GRR Rapid Response’s and Spotify’s Git project repositories. During the 
review it was seen to be suitable that the initial build environment of divided GRR 
Docker image should use the same folder structure as Spotify’s FOSS team designed 
it as illustrated in Figure 3.  
 
 
Figure 3. Initial build environment structure for containerized GRR 
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The use of this kind of folder structure originates from the fact that when the Docker 
image is built from Dockerfile, Docker uses a special build context for the image. 
Build context uses by default everything located in the same directory for the build 
process. Hence, every image to be created from Dockerfile should have only the nec-
essary files and subdirectories for the build process in the same directory to keep the 
build process efficient. It is worth noticing that excluding additional files and subdi-
rectories from build context is also possible if special .dockerignore file is used; how-
ever, on initial build environment the use of .dockerfile was omitted since the direc-
tory structure itself reduced and dimensioned the build context correctly. (Dockerfile 
reference n.d.)  
As mentioned, Spotify’s Terraform implementation was partly obsolete due to ver-
sion updates made to GRR. In addition, Spotify’s implementation consists of code 
mainly targeted for Terraform implementation in GCE. For this reason, every file that 
had source code or configurations related to Terraform or GCE was examined, left 
out or modified from execution of the containerized GRR build environment. There 
was also a need to write totally new BASH (Bourne-Again Shell) shell scripts to make 
the preparation for deployment process of GRR server more convenient. Hence, the 
folder structure was the only concern seen to be suitably used as it is in Spotify’s im-
plementation. Figure 4 illustrates the final working and the tested build environment 
structure for the containerized GRR version 3.3.0.8, the latest version of GRR (re-
leased on 9 Oct 2019).  
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Figure 4. Build environment structure for containerized GRR Rapid Response 
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The division work of official GRR image happened to be a more challenging process 
than predicted. A lot of time for division work was needed to be used only for GRR’s 
and Spotify’s code base reviews, and it was required to read official documentation 
to understand the fundamental functionalities of GRR. For example, GRR uses in its 
working special configuration parameter expansion, filtering the syntax of which is 
totally unique.  
Another challenge was solving the build process for each logical component. As 
Docker, GRR uses a special build context when components are deployed; however, 
in the official image the build of components are bundled into one build process. In 
the end, the use of GRR configuration filters, single component build context, and 
other issues were solved. After testing, the division work of official GRR Docker im-
age succeeded without errors.  
The Spotify’s code base is licenced under Apache License, version 2.0 meaning that 
the licence used for the division work was needed to be the set to the same or 
stricter license so that the violation of terms of licence does not occur. The license 
for division work was set to be Apache Licence, version 2.0. (Apache License 2019.)  
5.4 Deployment of containerized GRR server 
For the deployment of containerized GRR, a special Docker Compose file was com-
posed. Every Dockerfile can be used to build a respective image, which can then be 
used to launch a running instance of the image, respective Docker container. How-
ever, when multi-container applications with different services are created, and the 
number of images to be built increases, the more convenient way is to use Docker 
Compose file. The file is composed using YAML (YAML Ain’t Markup Language) data 
serialization standard language, which is a manageable and user-friendly way to de-
scribe and manage the multi-container application and its configuration parameters. 
Every service of multi-container application is described to the Docker Compose file 
separately; however, by default the run of which is performed simultaneously. (Ben-
Kiki, Evans & döt Net 2009; Compose file version 3 reference n.d; Overview of Docker 
Compose n.d.)  
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Docker Compose and the constructed Docker Compose file enable deployment of the 
containerized GRR in two commands. The first command is used to create a suitable 
subnetwork for the containers allowing data transmission between correct compo-
nents with limited access to the system and external network. The second command 
is used for building, deploying, and launching the run of multi-container GRR server 
from composed Docker Compose file. This was seen to meet the requirement set by 
the assignor for the simple and straightforward deployment of GRR server.  
Figure 5 presents the functionality of containerized GRR server components. As men-
tioned, when deployed all communication between components is transmitted on its 
own isolated subnetwork. However, the HTTP front-end and user interface have lim-
ited access to the system and external network through the Nginx reverse proxy. Re-
verse proxy ensures that the communication from GRR agents and investigation 
workstation to the GRR server is transmitted successfully to the corresponsive com-
ponents and vice versa. Container name conventions presented in Figure 5 should be 
comprehended as follows:  
• grr-proxy equals to Nginx reverse proxy 
• grr-admin equals to user interface component 
• grr-front equals to HTTP front-end component 
• grr-worker equals to worker component 
• grr-mysql equals to data store component.  
 
38 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Functionality of containerized GRR 
 
Reverse proxy also provides added security for the data transmission between inves-
tigation workstation and GRR server offering TLS (Transport Layer Security) encryp-
tion for the transmitted data during TCP (Transmission Control Protocol) connection 
ergo HTTPS (Hypertext Transport Protocol Secure) when administrative GUI or API 
endpoint is reached by the investigator. Furthermore, Nginx reverse proxy can be 
also used for load balancing, which enables division of the same type traffic between 
multiple similar containers reducing the load directed to the single component. This 
is a feature needed when component scaling is performed. (Nginx n.d.)  
Inves ga on  omain
Containerized GRR
grr-proxy
grr-admin
grr-worker
grr-mysql
grr-front
Client I   xyz
Inves ga on
worksta on
GRR Server
GRR Agent
39 
 
 
5.5 Deployment of GRR and osquery agents 
When the containerized GRR server is deployed, the server populates a local direc-
tory from build environment with a respective GRR agent installers for every sup-
ported OS. The GRR agents along with osquery agents can then be installed and de-
ployed on desired endpoints. However, the GRR server does not provide installers for 
the osquery agents directly, and they must be fetched separately from official 
source.  
A convenient way to carry out agent installation on endpoints in organizational envi-
ronments is to use centralized management such the Group Policies offers in Active 
Directory environments. Group Policies allow pushing organization-wide agent instal-
lation, update, and uninstallation on desired endpoints. However, after the contain-
erized GRR has been deployed, the server can also be used directly to push updates 
for the GRR agent and if desired, perform agent termination or uninstallation. By de-
fault, the containerized GRR can manage osquery agents only when an investigation 
is made; however, the server allows execution of binaries on clients, the feature of 
which can be used to deliver e.g. updates on osquery agents.  
When the agent installation process is terminated successfully, the GRR agent in-
tends to connect to the containerized GRR and if it succeeds, the respective client is 
added to the list of known clients on the server with status active. The message ex-
change between server and active status client agents can then be transmitted and 
investigation work in investigation domain established.  
 
6 Capability testing 
6.1 Overview 
Capability testing test case was constructed and executed to produce results for the 
capability related research question: “How well and reliably can the selected tool be 
used to identify and contain incidents from the selected organizational environ-
ment?” In the test case the RGCE’s organizational environment Funnel was used as a 
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testing environment, which was used to simulate a real-world organization environ-
ment on which the deployment and implementation of the researched tools were 
performed and results for the research question gathered.  
The real-world APT level cyber-attack was generated on testing environment which 
involved the researched tools to investigate attacked environment endpoints on 
which the realistic adversary techniques were targeted at. The tools were used to 
gather attack related data, artefacts, from the management workstations. The ac-
quired artefacts were determined based on IoCs that the generated test case attack 
left on the target systems.  
6.2 Testing environment 
Testing environment selection was made based on requirements defined together 
with the assignor in order to create a real-world circumstance for the test case exe-
cution. First, the selected environments had to simulate the real-world organization 
environment as accurately as possible from including public and internal services and 
endpoints to correct networking solutions. Secondly, the deployment of the re-
searched tools on the environment should be a straightforward process.  
RGCE’s road tunnel provider Funnel’s environment was selected to be used as testing 
environment. Funnel is a fictional organization, the main objective of which is to pro-
vide an undersea road tunnel between Helsinki and Tallinn. Funnel’s network is di-
vided into two separate segments: office and management, of which the office seg-
ment was selected to be used in the test case. The organization’s environment was 
designed bearing in mind JYVSECTEC’s commercial  igital Forensics and Incident Re-
sponse (DFIR) trainings, and therefore it adapted perfectly to be used also in capabil-
ity testing. The precise description of Funnel network topology is not relevant for the 
execution of research and for this reason it is omitted. (JYVSECTEC Cyber Range – 
RGCE and solutions n.d.)  
Figure 6 illustrates the structure of the testing environment in the resolution needed 
to describe of how the tool deployment was made to the environment. Furthermore, 
Figure 6 explains how the investigation workflow on the testing environments was 
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resolved: Starting from on how the investigation workstation was managed by inves-
tigator to request GRR server to start investigation on client(s) where GRR and os-
query agent(s) were installed, which then sent results to GRR server informing the in-
vestigation workstation to show generated results to the investigator.  
 
 
Figure 6. Investigation workflow on testing environment 
 
It is worth noticing that the containerized GRR server could have been made inside or 
deployed outside of the testing organization environment’s network; however, for 
the execution of the test case the GRR server was placed inside of the Funnel organi-
zation’s management network segment, where it was managed remotely by the in-
vestigation workstation. GRR and osquery agents were installed and deployed using 
centralized Group Policy on ten management workstations running Windows 7 OS.  
6.3 Test case attack 
6.3.1 Purpose 
The test case attack for the capability testing was created on Funnel’s organization 
environment to involve the researched tools to investigate and to gather artefacts 
related to the real-world incident from the environment’s management workstation 
to enable evaluation of the capability of the researched tools. The attack comprised 
APT level techniques to create a real-world security incident on Funnel’s organization 
environment’s staff network.  
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Used techniques in test case attack produced IoCs to the target environment’s man-
agement workstations. This knowledge was used for the tools to focus on the investi-
gation and collect only the corresponsive artefacts from the systems where the GRR 
and osquery agents were installed.  
6.3.2 Phases 
An email message with malicious OpenDocument Text (ODT) attachment was sent to 
four employees of Funnel roadway tunnel organization. The sender’s email address 
was spoofed to see that it was sent from a person with whom the employees have a 
trusted relationship. The document included a macro created by Visual Basic for Ap-
plication (VBA) containing an obfuscated PowerShell script. The obfuscated script 
was executed on the system when the document was opened, and the run of macros 
was accepted. (Dent & Blawat 2017; Snover 2016.)  
The email attachment was opened and executed in total of four of the ten Funnel 
management workstations by employees. The obfuscated PowerShell script in mali-
cious macro planted and executed a Cobalt Strike Beacon from the target file system 
which started immediately to communicate with the Command and Control (C2) 
server. Beacon communicated with the C2 server in constant intervals using HTTP re-
quests and DNS queries and executed the commands sent from the C2 server on the 
target environment. (Cobalt Strike documentation n.d.)  
Using the Cobalt Strike Beacon an internal recon was executed in the target environ-
ment with an intention to find those servers and services from the environment that 
can be used in lateral movement or contained potentially useful information. The in-
ternal recon consisted of actions such as port scanning of various subnets on target 
environment network and unsuccessful logins attempts to Domain Controller (DC) 
using a fileless PowerShell script. Furthermore, the organizations network share was 
explored, which revealed a valuable file. The file contained information about the do-
main administrator credentials, which were then used to successfully login remotely 
to the organization’s DC using Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI). 
The Figure 7 illustrates the different phases of the described test case attack from ini-
tial access to the lateral movement. 
43 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Anatomy of test case attack 
 
6.3.3 Mapping the techniques 
Mitre ATT&CK Framework is a community-driven knowledge base. The framework’s 
enterprise version consists of a detailed information about the TTPs that the APT-
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level actors have observed to be using during their campaigns targeted at organiza-
tion environments. According to Mitre (n.d), the framework’s construction work was 
started in 2013 by Mitre and on 9 October 2019 the framework consisted of 12 dif-
ferent enterprise tactics, 266 techniques and 41 mitigation methods. (Mitre ATT&CK 
n.d.)  
The usefulness of the framework has been absorbed widely by the different actors in 
the domain of cyber security such as software vendors, government agencies as well 
as private sector and service community. A large number of different actors use the 
framework when referring to APT actors and their capabilities in their products to 
share information to the end-users. For instance, Microsoft refers to Mitre’s 
knowledge base in Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection (WDATP) service. 
Furthermore, different tools have added features and modules to enable referencing 
in Mitre’s knowledge base. One of the well-known Microsoft Sysinternal tools, sys-
tem monitoring tool Sysmon, has optional configuration developed by Olaf Hartong 
enabling the mapping of malicious events to the corresponsive technique in Mitre’s 
knowledge base. (Mitre ATT&CK n.d; Sysmon modular n.d.)  
Mitre ATT&CK Framework’s technique navigator can be used to illustrate (Figure 8) 
how the used TTPs in different phases of the executed test case attack projects to 
the Mitre ATT&CK Framework matrix.  
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Figure 8. Mitre ATT&CK Framework – Technique navigator (filtered)  
 
The illustrated matrix shows that the used TTPs in the test case attack are the same 
as the APT actors have been used in their campaigns. It is worth noticing that the 
used techniques cover only the phases from the initial access to the lateral move-
ment on a matrix. However, in this research the scope of the attack was seen to be 
reliable to gather accurate results, and the execution of other attack phases was 
omitted.  
In this research the mapping of the test case attack techniques to the Mitre’s matrix 
was used only for the verification purposes; however, if mitigation methods, require-
ments or additional information about the used techniques and adversaries who are 
known to be using these techniques should be needed, the mapped fields of the ma-
trix should have led directly to the corresponding source of Mitre’s knowledge base.  
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7 Performance requirement testing 
7.1 Overview 
Performance requirement testing was constructed and executed to produce data 
that can be used to answer the research question  “What are the performance re-
quirements when the selected tool is used for investigation performed in organiza-
tional environment that consists of hundreds of endpoints?”.  
To generate accurate results the researched tools were used normally, meaning that 
the tools were tested as they should be used in everyday investigation in real-world 
circumstances. It is advisable to notice that the test was not created to benchmark 
the tools but only for dictating performance requirements needed when the perfor-
mance recommendations for the cybercrime prevention environment is made by as-
signor.  
Performance requirement testing focused on the server-side of GRR, and testing for 
the GRR and osquery agents was excluded from the research. As the GRR’s develop-
ers indicate on GRR’s official documentation (n.d), the certain server-side compo-
nents are under high load when an investigation is performed. In addition, it was no-
ticed that there was already existing research material available about the GRR agent 
memory usage considerations and footprint on client (Moser & Cohen 2013). What is 
more, the deployment and development work performed for the GRR’s server-side, 
containerized GRR, raised the need to focus performance testing on the server-side 
of GRR. For beforementioned reasons the scope for the performance requirements 
testing was set with the assignor to consider only the server-side of GRR.  
7.2 Testing environment 
As in capability testing, the testing environment selection for performance require-
ment testing was made based on the requirements defined together with the as-
signor. In this way it was possible to provide accurate and reliable data for the per-
formance requirement evaluation. First, the organization used for performance re-
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quirement testing has had to consist of advanced monitoring software so that the ac-
curate monitoring could be executed and reliable data for the evaluation purposes 
generated. Second, the organization environment had to include hundreds of end-
points on where the investigation could be performed to create a valuable amount of 
monitoring data.  
The selected environment was totally unique since it was designed to be utilized only 
in one national cyber security exercise by only specific participating training organiza-
tion. Any other distinctive information about the training organization or the used 
testing environment could not be revealed since the delicense reasons. However, the 
used testing environment fills the predefined requirements. In addition, the investi-
gation workflow in testing environment corresponded to the workflow presented in 
capability testing.  
7.3 Load monitoring of containerized GRR 
A suitable event for the performance testing was chosen to be the KYHA2019tv cyber 
security exercise for Finland’s national defensive agencies. The five-day exercise was 
held in fall 2019 and was planned, organized and executed by JYVSECTEC. In exercise, 
the tools were used for everyday investigation to identify APT level security incidents 
from organizational environment. During the exercise a large collection of different 
adversary techniques was used, which produced an extensive amount of IoCs on the 
organization environment’s endpoints that were investigated from the artefacts 
gathered using the tools. (Security authorities develop their competence in National 
Cyber Security Exercise (KYHA19) 2019.)  
The GRR server was monitored using PRTG Network Monitoring software. PRTG ena-
bles a real-time monitoring as well as collecting and exporting data from sensors in 
between the specific time frame. PRTG sensors can be used to monitor different 
loads from the system such CPU (Central Processing Unit) and RAM (Random Access 
Memory) when protocols such as WMI and SNMP (Simple Network Management 
Protocol) are used. In addition, PRTG enables gathering data from network band-
width utilizing industrial softwares and standards such as NetFlow and sFlow. (Moni-
tor Load n.d.)  
48 
 
 
Port binding and requested certificate files were configured on the host’s Docker 
daemon unit file, which enabled to add a sensor for each container of containerized 
GRR server component in PRTG monitoring software. In this way it was possible to 
monitor and gather load data from distinct components in a centralized way. (PRTG 
Manual – Docker Container Status Sensor n.d.)  
Load monitoring data was used to indicate those components of the GRR server that 
were under high load during the test case and can be considered as possible bottle-
necks if sufficient resource targeting is not executed and investigation is made inten-
sively in large scale. After the test case the accurate data from sensors were exported 
as CSV data. The results from the exported data were calculated and used to make 
performance recommendations for the containerized GRR.  
Table 1 presents the details of the hardware components used in the test case for 
the containerized GRR. The hardware consisted of a single dual-core CPU with rea-
sonable amount of memory (RAM), 8 GB. In addition, the hardware included a hard 
disk with total of 164 GB free space. The assigned resources were seen to be enough 
so that there is no exhaustion of resources during test case. The host system had 
CentOS Linux 7 OS with Docker Engine and Docker Compose installed.  
 
Table 1. Used hardware 
Component Description 
CPU 1 dual-core 
Hard disk 164 GB 
Memory 8 GB 
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8 Results 
8.1 Containerized GRR 
The deployment work of GRR server produced a unique containerized GRR, which 
was developed to meet the requirements set by the assignor for the tool’s deploy-
ment on RGCE’s organizational environment. Containerized GRR brings added value 
when deployment of GRR Rapid Response is considered; however, when following 
features are also required from the tool:  
• Simple and straightforward deployment process using Docker images 
• Scaling for a single component is possible to perform 
• Minimal need for required dependencies 
• Added security.  
 
Containerized GRR should be considered as a current work as the member of GRR’s 
developer team, Ogaro (Ogaro 2019b) informed that the containerization of GRR is 
also one of the team’s main priorities in the medium or long run. The development 
work made for containerized GRR is directly available for the use of GRR developer 
team and other developers, since the work will be published by the assignor in near 
future. Appendix 1 presents the deployment manual for the containerized GRR, 
which can be used as a reference material when the tool is deployed.  
It is worth noticing that the testing made for containerized GRR was limited due to 
time restrictions and for this reason the more intensive testing and the evaluation 
also by other contributors needs to be performed to test the tool is trustworthy. Fur-
thermore, the scalability of the containerized GRR was not tested during the re-
search, since it was not demanded by the test cases or testing environment circum-
stances; however, testing the single component scalability opens a need for further 
research.  
In the end, containerized GRR functioned and performed from the test cases without 
any errors, which shows that the performed development work has been successful 
and the objective set for the deployment work of the researched tools was reached.  
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8.2 Capabilities 
The produced results involved preselected remote live response tools, GRR and os-
query, to gather data about the generated APT level incident targeted in a real-world 
organization environment.  
Table 2 presents the general information about the investigation performed in Fun-
nel’s organization environment during the test case execution. Active clients present 
the number of those management testing environment’s management workstations 
on which GRR and osquery agents were deployed. Respectively, contaminated clients 
indicate the number of the endpoints found the be contaminated by the test case at-
tack. Used flows and hunts present those features of GRR that were used to gather 
artefacts from endpoints using GRR and osquery agents.  
 
Table 2. Investigation details 
Information Value 
Active clients 10 
Contaminated clients 4 
Used flows and hunts MultiGetFile, ListDirectory, ArtifactCol-
lectorFlow, OsqueryFlow, Client Side 
File Finder, Netstat, ListProcesses 
 
Table 3 consists of descriptive information about IoCs that the test case attack pro-
duced to the Funnel organization environment’s management workstations and cor-
responsive artefacts acquired during the test case using the researched tools. The 
workstations with artefacts consisting of test case attack related IoCs were consid-
ered as contaminated and the containment for the workstations from the testing en-
vironment was performed.  
 
Table 3. Gathered artefacts 
IoC description Gathered artefacts 
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Malicious email attachment File system, Prefetch files, Running pro-
cesses 
Obfuscated PowerShell script Windows Event log 
Cobalt Strike Beacon  File system, Running processes, Out-
bound network traffic, Prefetch files 
Fileless PowerShell script Windows Event Log, Localhost network 
traffic 
 
Table 4 presents the capability of the researched tools in a summary. The purpose is 
to adduce features from both tools that were able to be used to gather artefacts con-
sisting those IoCs that tie the client in question to the test case attack. In addition, 
the results show those features of the tools that overlapped with each other, and 
possible caveats when data was collected.  
 
Table 4. Artefact acquiring capabilities 
Artefact GRR Rapid Response Osquery 
File system Audit / Collect Audit 
Localhost network traffic Audit / Collect Audit 
Outbound network traffic Audit / Collect Audit 
Prefetch files (Audit) / Collect (Audit) 
Running processes Audit / Collect Audit 
Windows Event log (Audit) / Collect Audit 
 
Audit points those artefacts that were able to gather without extracting them sepa-
rately from the target system and collect in turn those artefacts that could be ex-
tracted and pulled from the target system using the researched tools. Audit with pa-
rentheses indicates that the tool was able to audit the desired artefact; however, the 
used mean does not suffice when the precise investigation is executed.  
The capability of the tool depended on how well and reliably the tool was able to 
gather incident related artefacts from the clients. Presented results do not take into 
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account which tool is preferable or has a better feature to perform a specific task on 
the client during investigation, since this was not in the scope of research. In addi-
tion, the results evaluate the capability of the tools when they are used for investiga-
tion in similar circumstances.  
As the results indicate, the tools overlap with each other when speaking of data au-
diting; however, only GRR Rapid Response was able to extract and collect all the de-
sired artefacts from contaminated workstations. Osquery’s ability to only audit data 
originates from the fact that the osquery is designed to describe the system and it 
changes. For this reason, lack of data extraction feature in osquery should not be 
considered as a shortage.  
It should also be noted that the GRR is able to audit Windows Event log and Prefetch 
files in file system level; however, the tool’s text and hex views do not describe the 
contents of the binary formatted files in human-readable format and for this reason 
the lack of audit possibility was considered as a caveat. However, the possibility to 
audit files’ contents in beforementioned ways is a desired feature when other types 
of binary and text files are examined. Furthermore, osquery was able to audit the 
contents of Windows Event log files; however, auditing the Prefetch files consisted of 
only the file system level auditing as in GRR.  
The GRR consisted of a large collection of flows for different artefact auditing and 
collection to be used via user interfaces, such as listing and acquiring binaries for run-
ning processes; however, some artefacts such as specific Windows Event logs were 
needed to be collected separately using flows that allow direct file system explora-
tion and data extraction. It is worth noticing that some of the flows also had similari-
ties with each other and explanations about the differences were frail. One explana-
tion for multiple similar flows was found to be related to the fact that some of the 
flows are just a more robust and efficient implementation of its predecessor; how-
ever, use of the correct flows is left to the investigator, and lack of precise references 
exists.  
The osquery was used by GRR mainly via specific collector flow assigned for the use 
of osquery. The flow allowed use of osquery in a similar way as it functions without 
GRR, i.e. performing database queries. Constructing and performing queries for the 
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use of test case artefact auditing was straightforward and efficient. After the corre-
sponsive query was constructed and executed, the results were directly available to 
be examined from the GRR’s user interfaces. In spite of overlap between similar fea-
tures, the GRR’s support for osquery was considered to be a desired feature, since it 
enabled efficient and human-friendly data auditing after the syntax of the queries 
was absorbed.  
As mentioned earlier, without the GRR’s ability to operate as osquery’s fleet man-
ager, the use of osquery agents remotely by default should not have been possible 
and implemention of centralized manager for osquery should have to be solved and 
implemented separately. In this research the researched tools were used to extend 
each other, not excluding others’ necessity.  
In the end, the tools have caveats and features that overlap with each other; how-
ever, when these concerns are taken in account the both of the researched tools, 
GRR Rapid Response and osquery were able to perform remote live response well 
and reliably and have a strong capability when security incident related artefact data 
is audited and collected from endpoints on organizational environment during secu-
rity incident investigation.  
8.3 Performance requirements 
The produced results involved using the preselected remote live response tools, GRR 
Rapid Response and osquery for security incident investigation in cyber security exer-
cise event in five-day duration so that it was possible to gather a reasonable amount 
of data for evaluation from PRTG Network Monitoring software sensors.  
Table 5 presents the general information about the test case execution. The number 
of installed clients presents those endpoints on testing environment on which GRR 
and osquery agents were installed and deployed. Furthermore, the number of PRTG 
sensors equals the number of monitored GRR server component containers.  
 
Table 5. General information 
Information Value 
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Clients 173 
Monitoring software PRTG Network Monitor software 
PRTG sensors 4 
Test case duration (days) 5 
 
Investigation related data gathered from GRR server is composed in Table 6. The 
number of terminated flows is directional, and precise value lands somewhere be-
tween 5,800 and 6,000 terminated flows. In addition, the number of active clients in-
dicates the highest coincidental number of clients that were in active state during the 
test case. Due to the nature of the test case event, the number of active clients var-
ied between days; however, remaining over 160 clients on each day of test case.  
 
Table 6. Investigation related information 
Information Value 
Active clients 173 
Active cron jobs 6 
Executed hunts 22 
Terminated flows > 5800 
 
Figures 9–12 present the monitored load for each containerized GRR container ac-
quired from PRTG Network Monitoring software sensors during test case. The 
amount of investigation presented in Table 6 was enough to produce a reliable load 
on containers. As the results indicate the load could have been notably larger and 
still the exhaustion of resources would have taken place; however, by the nature of 
the test case event, the load of investigation was not controllable during the test 
case. The Figures 9–12 presents the following calculated average loads from five-day 
duration to each container:  
• CPU usage 
• Memory (RAM) usage 
• Packet speed (Sum of input and output speed)  
• Total packet count (Sum of input and output count).  
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In Figures 9–12 the average load by container is presented in thick black lines in blue 
boxes. Blue boxes indicate the range in which most of the measured values landed, 
and the T values the highest and lowest measured values during test case execution. 
Container name conventions presented in Figures 9–12 should be comprehended as 
follows:  
• admin equals to user interface component 
• front equals to HTTP front-end component 
• worker equals to worker component 
• mysql equals to data store component.  
 
Figure 9 presents the memory usage of each containerized GRR container. The re-
sults show that the HTTP front-end has on average the highest memory usage, 
around 9 %, as well as that the worker container had the least memory usage, only 
2–3 %. The biggest variance on memory usage in five-day time frame was on MySQL 
database container (4–10 %).  
 
 
Figure 9. Memory usage by container 
 
Figure 10 presents the CPU usage of each containerized GRR container. As in memory 
usage, the HTTP front-end container’s CPU usage average was the largest, being 
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around 20 %. The second highest CPU usage average was measured by MySQL data-
base container sensor; however, the difference between HTTP front-end and MySQL 
database is significant, around 15 %. The produced results indicate that the user in-
terface and worker container’s CPU usage is quite moderate and does not charge re-
sources from the underlying hardware.  
 
 
Figure 10. CPU usage by container 
 
Figure 11 presents the overall of inbound and outbound packet speed by container-
ized GRR container. The results indicate that the HTTP front-end and MySQL data-
base containers had the highest packet speed average during the test case as well as 
that the user interface and worker container’s overall packet speed is quite moder-
ate. Furthermore, the results indicate that the HTTP front-end and MySQL database 
containers manage the major part of the data transmission.  
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Figure 11. Packet speed by container 
 
Figure 12 presents the packet count by containerized GRR container. As in packet 
speed, the packet count results indicate that the containerized GRR’s data transmis-
sion relies largely on two components, HTTP front-end and MySQL database.  
 
 
Figure 12. Packet count by container 
 
58 
 
 
Table 7 presents the containerized GRR’s image disk space usage, the minimum 
space which is needed when the initial deployment of containerized GRR is made.  
 
Table 7. Images space usage 
Docker image Size (GB) 
grr-admin 1.8 
grr-front 1.8 
grr-mysql 0.5 
grr-proxy 0.2 
grr-worker 1.8 
Total 6.1 
 
Table 8 presents the hard disk usage by each container and the total hard disk usage 
of containerized GRR in five-day duration. It is advisable to notice that the values pre-
sented in Table 8 do not take into account the size of collected artefacts, which re-
duced the investigation workstation’s hard disk space, not the host’s where the con-
tainerized GRR was deployed.  
 
Table 8. Containers space usage 
Docker container Size (GB) 
grr-admin 0.9 
grr-front 34.6 
grr-mysql (mounted) 0.6 
grr-proxy 0.3 
grr-worker 2.9 
Total 39.3 
 
The results show that the used hardware during test case was suitable enough; how-
ever, if investigation duration had been longer, the available hard disk space would 
have been reduced and shredded. The reason for excessive disk usage originates 
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from the fact that the verbose logging feature was enabled during the test case exe-
cution being the largest single factor for the high disk usage. The log files consumed 
around 36.7 GB, which is over 90 % of total container’s hard disk space usage. With-
out having verbose logging enabled, the disk usage would have been quite moderate. 
In addition, at no point of test case does any container consume over 25% CPU or 
memory, which proved that the selected hardware for the test case was reasonable; 
however, not being extravagant.  
The results also show that the assumptions stated by developers in GRR’s official 
documentation were correct: HTTP front-end component was under higher load than 
other components, and is a possible bottleneck if resources are not correctly dimen-
sioned. In addition, the user interface component load was moderate.  
Table 9 presents the hardware recommendations which are composed by the exe-
cuted test case. Recommendations cover the hardware requirements when the con-
tainerized GRR is used for remote live response on environments that consist of hun-
dreds of endpoints, and the investigation is performed in similar circumstances. The 
recommendations should cover also the requirements when a single component 
scaling for the containerized GRR is performed; however, scaling and its impact 
should be tested and verified separately.  
 
Table 9. Recommended hardware 
Component Description 
CPU 1 dual-core 
Memory 8 GB 
Hard disk 32 GB 
 
It should be noticed that the suggested hard disk recommendation do not cover ver-
bose logging. The logging of containerized GRR should be handled using distinct cen-
tralized logging system and have verbose logging feature enabled only when the test-
ing for the tool is performed.  
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9 Conclusions 
9.1 Discussion 
The main scope of the research focused on two different test cases involving the re-
mote live response tools, GRR Rapid Response and osquery, preselected by the as-
signor to gather data, artefacts, related to occurred incidents from real-world organi-
zation environment’s endpoints that indicated both the tools’ capability and perfor-
mance requirements. The research also involved using a significant part of the time 
for practical deployment work of the tools to the selected environments in RGCE, 
solving and taking into account the requirements set by the assignor first.  
The deployment process of the tools should be considered as a straightforward pro-
cess and the developers’ official documentations consult the user in a sufficient man-
ner if universal tool is deployed. When the deployment work for the tools is started 
in environments with special restrictions or if special requirements are set for the 
tools, as in this research, the deployment work should be considered to reverse time, 
expertise, and additional resources. In such cases, implementing the tool is a devel-
opment process itself and no easy solutions exist, since every requirement have to 
be examined, evaluated, and solved separately when the tool’s deployment process 
is started or even considered. In addition, such deployment work needs testing, 
which also bonds resources and time.  
It should also be noted that even if there are pre-existing available solutions made by 
other developers, they consist inexorably of caveats and should not be considered to 
fit directly for the deployer’s needs without a precise evaluation. However, as the re-
search proved, other developers’ pre-made solutions can contain valuable infor-
mation and a possible starting point for the development work. Furthermore, the im-
plementation of the tool with special needs is easier to perform when the tool and 
solutions are open sourced, and the specification for the requirements is set and well 
known.  
The capability test case results indicate that even when the remote live response 
tools have maturity, strong developer background, and are designed to be able to 
perform investigation in a large scale and an intensive manner, tools have necessarily 
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caveats or overlap with other similar tools designed for the same kind of purpose. 
For this reason, the “one fits for all” out of the box open source tool for remote live 
response should be not considered to exist. However, the researched tools fit per-
fectly to the investigator’s toolkit when the tool’s individual constricts and deficien-
cies are recognised and evaluated, and when the overlap between tools is noticed 
and accepted.  
If the researched tools are used separately, they do not give as much for the investi-
gator as the GRR’s capability to function as an osquery’s fleet manager is utilized. If 
GRR is used as an osquery fleet manager, it gives an investigator a combination of 
two tools that extend the investigator’s ability to investigate the target systems more 
extensively and efficiently. In addition, since the osquery does not include a central-
ized way to handle agents in remote locations by default, the GRR should be consid-
ered as being a saving when deployment time that is required to be spent when the 
centralized fleet manager for the osquery is implemented. Implementation of fleet 
manager is necessary if the remote live response is wanted to be executed by using 
osquery in large organizational environments. As mentioned, the features that over-
lap between tools are also easier to perceive when the tools are used as one in inves-
tigation workflow. By this way the best features from both tools can be recognized 
and used.  
Performance test case results indicate the performance requirements of the contain-
erized GRR are moderate when investigation in similar circumstances is performed. 
However, this is not always the case and if the investigation made on environments 
consisting of tens of thousands of endpoints, the tool will consume resources in a dif-
ferent manner. The recommendations made should, however, cover the most com-
mon investigation use cases performed in similar organization environments and cir-
cumstances.  
The usage of remote live response tools requires expertise from the user. The tools 
are developed with a special purpose in mind, and the user must understand and 
master the purpose and proper use of the tools to get the most out of them. How-
ever, the usage of the tools is not always unambiguous, and developers often de-
scribe the most common use cases in documentation, omitting the specific needs of 
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environments to be deployed and the complex features that are usually left to the 
user’s own concern.  
Cooperation with the assignor of the thesis was a success. Information, expertise, ad-
ministration, and consultation was shared during the research to get the best possi-
ble results for the research work. The research work was transparent between par-
ties, which enabled solving the raised issues during the research such RGCE environ-
mental questions.  
Selected research methodology, applied research, applied to the research well. By 
the nature of the research, it focused largely on tools and their deployments as well 
as test cases which also were largely practical work. In addition, the assignor of the 
research is satisfied with the produced results, which indicates that the research 
methodology used was selected well, and that the research was able to cover the re-
search questions set for the research correctly. Furthermore, all the considerations 
and requirements that the assignor set for the research were achieved.  
The accuracy of research was dimensioned correctly; however, correct dimensioning 
required omitting the Mitre ATT&CK Framework’s phases  collection, command and 
control, exfiltration, and impact from the test case attack, which should have been 
executed in capability testing test case. In addition, the GRR Rapid Response and os-
query agent testing in the performance requirement test case was excluded from the 
research. However, the accuracy of the research did not jeopardize the results and 
answers to the research questions; vice versa, dimensioning produced more accurate 
results.  
9.2 Reliability of research 
The results of research can be considered reliable. In different phases of research 
criticism and additional time was used for observation. In reference material gather-
ing source criticism was performed. During the development work of the researched 
tools and the test case construction the focus was on producing accurate results for 
research and any unambiguousness was omitted.  
The results indicate that the use of containerized GRR can be considered as reliable 
as the use of official Docker image directly; however, as mentioned, excessive testing 
63 
 
 
needs to be executed to verify the reliability. The direction of a development work; 
however, has been correct, since the GRR Rapid Response’s development team’s de-
sire is also to bring the containerization feature to the GRR in future.  
9.3 Further research 
The research results proved that the two test cases were suitable enough to indicate 
the tools’ capability and performance requirements. In addition, the research verified 
the possible caveat and overlap that the tools have when they are used simultane-
ously and as parts of the same investigation workflow. The results are suitable when 
further research is considered; however, during the research also a need for further 
research emerged.  
The research pointed out that the containerized GRR can be used to the investigation 
also in larger organizational environments; however, the research executed did not 
involve testing the containerized GRR’s component scalability, since the testing envi-
ronments used in test cases consisted of only at the best hundreds of endpoints. The 
scalability in larger deployments should be researched using similar real-world cir-
cumstances and suitable test cases as in this research, which evaluates the container-
ized GRR’s ability to perform investigation in environments consist of thousands of 
endpoints so the scalability of the tool can be verified.  
Furthermore, the research addressed a need to examine how the researched remote 
live response tools, GRR Rapid Response and osquery, change the target system’s 
state and what the tool’s impact is when used for investigation and data acquisition. 
Further research should cover log gathering and analysis, target machine’s state anal-
ysis as well as a descriptive guide for the investigator on how to perform the investi-
gation when using the tools, and automated use cases with corresponsive tests.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1. Deployment manual for containerized GRR server 
 
# Prerequisites 
Containerized GRR server is successfully tested on following operating systems:  
Ubuntu 18.04 Bionic (1 dual-core CPU, 8 GB RAM) with following packages and their 
respectively versions:  
• Docker Engine and Client v19.03.1 
• Docker Compose v1.24.1 
 
CentOS 7 (1 dual-core CPU, 8 GB RAM) with following packages and their respectively 
versions:  
• Docker Engine and Client v18.09.6 
• Docker Compose v1.24.0 
 
Docker images used during deployment process (hosted on Docker Hub):  
• grrdocker/grr:v3.3.0.8 
• mysql:5.7 
• nginx:latest 
• prom/prometheus:latest 
 
GRR agents are successfully tested on following operating systems and versions:  
• Windows Workstation 7, 10 
• Windows Server 2008, 2012 
• CentOS 7 
• Ubuntu 18.04 
 
# Quick deployment 
## GRR server 
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Deployment of containerized GRR server is designed to be a straightforward process. 
After you have executed the requirements shown in prerequisites section you should 
be able to deploy GRR server using following commands: 
• git clone https://github.com/JYVSECTEC/containerized-grr 
• cd ./containerized-grr 
• bash setup.sh 
• docker network create --driver=bridge --subnet=<SUBNETWORK> static 
• docker-compose up --build --detach 
 
If no errors occur command “docker-compose ps” should inform that there are now 
six containers up and running:  
• grr-admin 
• grr-front 
• grr-proxy 
• grr-mysql 
• grr-worker 
• grr-prometheus 
 
Now you can access the administrator GUI by browsing by Nginx IP address or URL 
and use the credentials provided during deployment process (default: admin/grr). 
However, you must install GRR agents on those clients that you want to examine be-
fore you can really execute any forensic tasks on endpoints. Consult the "GRR agent 
installation on clients" section for additional information.  
## GRR agent installation on clients 
After GRR Server is successfully deployed, client installers can be examined. GRR 
Server populates “./containerized-grr/installers” directory with installer packages for 
both 32-bit and 64-bit operating systems:  
• dbg_GRR_x.x.x.x_amd64.exe 
• dbg_GRR_x.x.x.x_i386.exe 
• grr_x.x.x.x_amd64.changes 
• grr_x.x.x.x_amd64.deb 
• GRR_x.x.x.x_amd64.exe 
• grr_x.x.x.x_amd64.pkg 
• grr_x.x.x.x_amd64.rpm 
• grr_x.x.x.x_i386.changes 
• grr_x.x.x.x_i386.deb 
• GRR_x.x.x.x_i386.exe 
• grr_x.x.x.x_i386.rpm 
71 
 
 
 
Depending on the client operating system, you can push the correct installer package 
to the client and execute it, or install agent using respective package manager:  
• # On Red Hat based Linux distros 
• yum install grr_x.x.x.x_amd64.rpm 
• # On Debian based Linux distros 
• dpkg --install grr_x.x.x.x_amd64.deb 
• # On Windows operating systems 
• .\GRR_x.x.x.x_amd64.exe 
• # On MacOS 
• sudo installer -pkg grr_x.x.x.x_amd64.pkg -target /  
 
# Configuration explained 
## Authentication 
In future containerized GRR will support various authentication methods, but cur-
rently there are two tested methods available (defaults to Remote Authentication):  
• Basic Authentication – Username and password are generated during setup process 
of GRR server and stored on the database 
• Remote Authentication – GRR server trusts authentication that the Nginx reverse 
proxy handles.  
 
## Database 
MySQL database files are mounted to host side of system to prevent any data loss if 
the container execution terminates.  
## Monitoring 
Containerized GRR includes Prometheus monitoring system which enables investiga-
tor to observe the status of each GRR sever component and query monitoring data 
for occurred changes. However, it should be noticed that the monitoring system is 
only implemented to bring additional feature for the server execution. Any exten-
sively testing of Prometheus is not made.  
## Proxy 
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Containerized GRR utilizes Nginx proxy which handles the traffic between GRR agents 
and GRR HTTP front-end. In addition, administrative user interface is accessed via 
proxy, and by default it handles the user authentication.  
Creating a new self-signed certificate for the proxy:  
• cd ./containerized-grr 
• openssl req -x509 -nodes -days 365 -newkey rsa:2048 -keyout ./nginx/cert.key -out 
./nginx/cert.crt 
 
Creating a new username and password for Remote Authentication:  
• cd ./containerized-grr 
• sh -c "echo -n '<USERNAME>:' >> ./nginx/.htpasswd" && sh -c "openssl passwd -apr1 
>> ./nginx/.htpasswd" 
 
## Osquery 
Containerized GRR supports also centralized management of osquery agents. GRR is 
configured to search osquery binary on clients from its default installation path, so it 
is advisable to keep binaries on their default installation location. Osquery is success-
fully tested in containerized GRR using the osquery version 4.0.2.  
